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Liberty, Equality and Deference:  
A Comment on Colin Feasby’s 
“Freedom of Expression and the Law 
of the Democratic Process” 
Christopher D. Bredt and Laura Pottie* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his paper, “Freedom of Expression and the Democratic Pro-
cess,” Colin Feasby accepts the Supreme Court’s adoption of the egali-
tarian model of electoral regulation in Harper v. Canada (Attorney 
General).
1
 Feasby’s main arguments are two-fold. First, while the 
Court should generally be deferential to Parliament’s choices regard-
ing democratic processes, Feasby asserts that this deference should not 
extend beyond the electoral realm. Thus, to the extent that the Canada 
Elections Act provisions at issue in Harper extend to non-electoral 
speech (i.e., to “pure” issue advocacy), there should be no deference. 
Second, Feasby argues that courts should be highly suspicious of legis-
lation that tends to support the status quo, since this can be seen as 
self-interested behaviour. 
We agree to a large extent with Feasby’s positions, with two main 
provisos. First, while the egalitarian model may be appropriate in some 
contexts, it is inadequate to address the range of participants and the 
resources brought to bear in an electoral context, nor does it accurately 
capture the range of regulations that Parliament has enacted. In fact, 
regulation of the electoral regime occurs within a range of libertarian and 
egalitarian principles. A more comprehensive approach to understanding 
                                                                                                                                
*
  Christopher D. Bredt is a partner and the National Chair of Borden Ladner Gervais 
LLP’s Constitutional Law Practice Group. Laura Pottie is an associate in the Commercial Litigation 
group at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP. The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful research 
assistance of Kinga Grudzinski, a summer law student at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP. 
1
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 [hereinafter “Harper”]. 
292  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
electoral regulation that takes all of the participants and all of the re-
sources into account is necessary.  
Second, while we agree with Feasby’s position that deference 
should not extend to non-electoral regulation of political advocacy, we 
believe that a healthy dose of judicial scepticism is particularly warrant-
ed in respect of regulation of advocacy within the electoral context. 
Experience has demonstrated a clear tendency for Parliament to enact 
legislation that preserves the status quo by giving preferential access to 
resources to incumbents and/or large established parties. This tendency 
should be balanced by a requirement for convincing evidence when 
justifying restrictions on participation in an election. 
II. THE EGALITARIAN MODEL IS INADEQUATE 
The egalitarian model is neither a comprehensive answer to the is-
sues posed by electoral regulation, nor has the concept been applied 
consistently by Parliament or by the courts. The electoral process in-
volves a complex interplay between a number of different participants 
with differing roles and access to a variety of resources. Electoral regu-
lation and judicial review of participants and their access to these re-
sources has seen both egalitarian and libertarian principles applied. 
However, both Parliament and the courts seem to address the intersec-
tions between participants and resources in isolation, without a con-
sistent or principled approach to regulation.  
There are a number of participants in the electoral process, each 
with differing and sometimes overlapping roles. These participants 
include: 
• political parties, including large established parties with national 
reach, smaller issue-specific or regional parties and fringe parties; 
• candidates, including candidates who are members of registered 
parties and independents; 
• third parties, which are usually interest groups that are issue-
focused, and seek to influence the views of others; and 
• voters, who may be members of a political party, activists, or inde-
pendent. 
 
Each participant brings a variety of resources to the process. These 
resources include: 
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• money, which is the most highly regulated resource;
2
 
• ideas, which are unregulated; 
• political capital, such as public profile and organizational ability, 
which is largely unregulated; and 





While money is a primary focus of electoral regulation, it is but one 
of a number of factors that determine whether or not any particular 
candidate is elected. Other resources can have an equal or even greater 
influence, and attempts to “equalize” one of these resources while leav-
ing others unregulated may only serve to exacerbate inequality. Equality 
is an elusive if not impossible goal in this context.  
For example, a candidate who is relatively unknown in a community 
may have access to significant financial resources, but may find these 
resources inadequate to challenge a long-time incumbent who is well-
known and respected within the electoral district. Similarly, no amount 
of money will suffice to “sell” an unpopular platform to an electorate; if 
a candidate’s positions are out of step with the needs or desires of his or 
her constituency, access to financial resources may not result in the 
election of that candidate. Candidates with equal financial resources will 
often have varying levels of charisma, media coverage, community 
status or public profile, and intellectual capital both in the form of indi-
vidual ideas and support from campaign managers and staff.  
While the Supreme Court in Harper expressly adopted the “egalitar-
ian” approach, its application of this approach is not consistent. Consid-
er for example the apparent conflict between the decisions in Sauvé v. 
Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) and Carter v. Reference re Provincial 
Electoral Boundaries (Sask.).
4
 In Sauvé, the Supreme Court focused on 
the effect of denying federal inmates the right to vote. The Court held 
that disenfranchisement of a discrete group of individuals threatened, 
among other things, the principles of equal rights and equal membership 
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embodied in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”).
5
 This 
right to equal membership, however, apparently does not include the 
right to have one’s vote counted equally. In Saskatchewan Boundaries, 
the Supreme Court was willing to accept deviations in voter parity of up 
to 25 per cent as acceptable under section 3. The Court expressly dis-
claimed an equality-based approach in that case, stating: 
Respect for individual dignity and social equality mandate that 
citizen’s votes not be unduly debased or diluted. But the need to 
recognize cultural and group identity and to enhance the participation 
of individuals in the electoral process and society requires that other 
concerns also be accommodated.
6
 
The most striking example of the inconsistency with which the egal-
itarian approach is applied and the inequality this creates is apparent 
when the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper is considered against 
Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General).
7
 There the Court applied sec-
tion 3 of the Charter to Election Act provisions restricting access to 
certain benefits to political parties flowing from registered party status. 
In order to obtain registered party status (and thus the benefits), the 
party was required to have nominated candidates in at least 50 electoral 
districts. The benefits included the issuance of tax receipts for donations 
received outside the election period, the right to transfer unspent elec-
tion funds to the party, and the right to list party affiliation on the ballot.  
Justice Iacobucci writing for the majority in Figueroa, emphasized 
that the right to vote under section 3 included more than simply the right 
to place a ballot in a box. Justice Iacobucci cited and concurred with 
McLachlin J.’s (as she then was) analysis in Haig v. Canada: 
The purpose of s. 3 of the Charter is, then, to grant every citizen of 
this country the right to play a meaningful role in the selection of 
elected representatives who, in turn, will be responsible for making 
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decisions embodied in legislation for which they will be accountable 
to their electorate.
8
 (Emphasis added) 
According to the majority in Figueroa, therefore, the right to vote 
includes the right to play a meaningful role in the electoral process. This 
is a participatory right, and one that is of fundamental importance in a 
free and democratic state. The right to participate in the electoral pro-
cess is not necessarily related to the composition of Parliament subse-
quent to an election, nor is the value of such participation related to its 
impact on the actual outcome of an election. As stated by Iacobucci J: 
It follows that participation in the electoral process has an intrinsic 
value independent of its impact upon the actual outcome of elections. 
To be certain, the electoral process is the means by which elected 
representatives are selected and governments formed, but it is also the 
primary means by which the average citizen participates in the open 
debate that animates the determination of social policy. The right to 
run for office provides each citizen with the opportunity … to express 
support for the ideas and opinions that a particular candidate endorses. 
In each instance, the democratic rights entrenched in s. 3 ensure that 
each citizen has an opportunity to express an opinion about the 
formation of social policy and the functioning of public institutions 
through participation in the electoral process.
9
 (Emphasis added) 
On this understanding of section 3, the Court set a two-part test to 
determine whether a restriction interferes with the capacity of individual 
citizens to play a meaningful role in the electoral process: 
 
(a) does the organization in question (in that case, members and sup-
porters of political parties that nominate fewer than fifty candidates) 
play a meaningful role in the electoral process, and 




In Harper, Bastarache J. ostensibly adopted and applied the 
Figueroa analysis, but the result is inconsistent. Justice Bastarache 
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viewed the third-party advertising restrictions as implicating the infor-
mational component of the right to vote. In other words: 
The right to meaningful participation includes a citizen’s right to 
exercise his or her vote in an informed manner. For a voter to be well 
informed, the citizen must be able to weigh the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each candidate and political party. The citizen must 
also be able to consider opposing aspects of issues associated with 
certain candidates and political parties where they exist. In short, the 
voter has a right to be “reasonably informed of all the possible 




On this analysis, spending limits are necessary in order to protect 
citizens’ right to electoral information. Voters are entitled to hear all 
points of view, and the affluent or individuals who combine resources 
cannot be permitted to dominate political discourse. An inequal dissem-
ination of points of view would undermine voters’ ability to be ade-
quately informed of all views, and thus spending limits are necessary 
and subject only to the restriction that they not be overly low so as to 
undermine the right to information in the context of an election.
12
 In 
holding that the spending restrictions did not violate section 3, 
Bastarache J. stated as follows: 
Meaningful participation in elections is not synonymous with the 
ability to mount a media campaign capable of determining the 
outcome. In fact, such an understanding of “meaningful participation” 
would leave little room in the political discourse for the individual 
citizen and would be inimical to the right to vote. Accordingly, there is 
no infringement of s. 3 in this case and no conflict between the right to 
vote and freedom of expression.
13
 
In our view, the majority approach in Harper misunderstands the 
nature of third parties and their role during an election. This misunder-
standing provides the basis for what is a very unequal approach to elec-
toral regulation. While individuals are undoubtedly entitled to 
information during an election and third parties can be a source of this 
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information, third parties are also an important vehicle through which 
individuals exercise their right to meaningfully participate in the demo-
cratic process. The majority in Harper appeared to view arguments with 
respect to third parties’ participatory role as a conflation of the right to 
vote with that of freedom of expression, and rejected the idea that the 
right to vote contained a right to electoral debate or expression.
14
 Re-
spectfully, this is too narrow a view of the role of third parties, particu-
larly in light of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Figueroa. 
In Figueroa, Iacobucci J. reviewed the meaningful role that small 
political parties play in the democratic process. The importance of the 
role of small parties was expressly not correlated to the question of 
whether or not they would actually participate in governance, as small 
parties are both a vehicle and an outlet for meaningful individual partic-
ipation. Political parties ensure that ideas and opinions are effectively 
represented in the open debate of an election, and are presented to the 
electorate. According to the Court, smaller parties play a special role 
since they tend to dissent from mainstream thinking and therefore bring 
forward a variety of issues and concerns, and provide individuals with 
an opportunity to express opinions on governmental policy.
15
 
The Court’s analysis in Figueroa applies equally to third parties 
during an election campaign. Meaningful participation in an election is 
not solely related to a potential role in actual governance. As acknowl-
edged by the minority in Harper and by Feasby, third parties perform 
many of the same functions as small parties and are uniquely positioned 
to do so with a greater level of fidelity to political ideas, and as such are 
a valuable and indeed essential part of the democratic process. As indi-
viduals or groups who are not seeking election, third parties are not 
subject to the need to cater their views to appeal to a broad audience. 
Third parties can and do both challenge positions taken by parties and 
candidates, and bring forward new issues that parties are unable or un-
willing to address.
16
 Third parties, like small parties, are both a vehicle 
and an outlet for individual participation, and thus play a meaningful 
role in the electoral process. 
Given the above, following Figueroa the proper question for the 
Court in Harper was whether the spending restrictions interfere with 
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third parties’ capacity to play a meaningful role in an election. Further, 
according to Iacobucci J. in Figueroa, “legislation that exacerbates a 
pre-existing disparity in the capacity of the various political parties to 
communicate their positions to the general public is inconsistent with  
s. 3.”
17
 Had the majority in Harper asked the proper questions, the an-
swer could only have been in the affirmative. The spending restrictions 
create a significant barrier to third party participation, not the least of 
which is to exacerbate the significant disparity that already existed be-
tween the ability of parties and candidates to communicate their posi-
tions, and that of third parties. This disparity is anything but egalitarian. 
Political parties and candidates are provided with significant support 
and access to resources both during and after election campaigns. Under 
the Elections Act, registered political parties are provided with access to 
information regarding voters, which can be used both for communi-
cating positions and for soliciting contributions.
18
 During elections, 
parties receive both free and discounted access to prime-time broadcast-
ing and partial reimbursement for election expenses.
19
 Registered parties 
who obtain a minimum level of electoral support also receive an annual 
allowance based on the number of votes received by the party in the 
previous general election.
20
 Further, donations to political parties or 
candidates are eligible for tax deductions under the Income Tax Act.
21
 
In contrast, third parties receive no such support. Donations to third-
party interest groups are not tax deductible. Broadcasters are not re-
quired to provide time to third parties during an election campaign, and 
no third party expenses are reimbursable by the federal government. 
Third parties are thus already at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis 
political parties in terms of their ability to participate in an election 
campaign. To further restrict these groups to spending only $150,000 
nationally on advertising during an election is to create such a disparity 
as to effectively prevent third parties from participating meaningfully in 
an election campaign. In Harper, Bastarache J. relied on a perceived 
danger of third parties drowning out the voices of candidates; in fact the 
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opposite is the case. Third parties’ voices are now effectively excluded 
from electoral discourse. 
To say that the egalitarian approach requires that third parties be 
equally restricted in their advertising spending also ignores the fact that 
finances are not allocated equally between parties themselves, nor is 
access to the media, as discussed above. It is difficult to see why, when 
resources and restrictions are not equally allocated between candidates 
and parties, third-party spending need be restricted on an “across-the-
board” basis in order to ensure fairness in the democratic process. 
Thus notwithstanding the Court’s adoption of the egalitarian model, 
the reality is that regulation of democratic processes occurs on a spec-
trum between egalitarian and libertarian principles, with any given set of 
rules landing at different points on that spectrum depending on the point 
of comparison. Attempts to equalize one resource (i.e., money), while 
adopting a libertarian approach to other resources (i.e., access to the 
media) can exacerbate existing inequalities rather than remedy them. 
The third-party spending rules are a good example. In one sense, the 
rules create a form of  restrictive equality between third parties since no 
one group can spend more than the prescribed limit. In another sense, 
however, the rules increase the already significant inequality between 
third parties and political parties.  
III.  DEFERENCE TO PARLIAMENT’S CHOICE IN ELECTORAL 
REGULATION IS INAPPROPRIATE 
In Harper, the majority of the Court articulated a deferential ap-
proach, as expressed by Bastarache J.: 
 Under the egalitarian model of elections, Parliament must balance 
the rights and privileges of the participants in the electoral process: 
candidates, political parties, third parties and voters ….  Given the 
right of Parliament to choose Canada’s electoral model and the 
nuances inherent in implementing this model, the Court must approach 
the justification analysis with deference ….  In the end, the electoral 
system, which regulates many aspects of an election, including its 
duration and the control and reimbursement of expenses, reflects a 
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Feasby’s paper recognizes that regulation of democratic processes is 
vulnerable to abuse, given the potential for self-interested behaviour on 
the part of Parliament. Feasby suggests that the Court must be cautious to 
confine its deference to the electoral realm, and argues that there should 
be less deference outside of that context. To that end, Feasby distin-
guishes between “sham” issue advocacy and “pure” issue advocacy. 
In our view, deference both within and outside of the electoral realm 
is unwarranted and potentially dangerous, for two main reasons. As 
noted in Harper by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., there is literally no 
evidence to support a claim that third-party advertising has a determina-
tive effect on an election.
23
 The concern with third-party expenditures 
and with money in general is motivated by the American congressional 
experience, which in our view is not an appropriate comparator. Second-
ly, and perhaps more importantly, a review of electoral regulation 
demonstrates Parliament’s clear tendency to legislate in its own self-
interest.  
Much of the concern in Canada with the influence of money and 
third-party expenditures during elections is influenced by the American 
experience. However, little thought or analysis is given to the differ-
ences between the Canadian and American political systems. The nature 
of the American congressional system of government is that party disci-
pline is weak, elected representatives routinely cross party lines on par-
ticular issues, and there is thus fertile ground for influence by well-
funded issue-oriented lobby groups. Canada’s parliamentary democracy, 
however, is dominated by the political parties. Party discipline is strong, 
and adherence to party lines can bring political rewards such as a sought 
after cabinet position. Canadian politicians are much less able to pursue 
their own personal agendas once in office, and third parties have less 
influence on the legislative behaviour of members of Parliament. Fur-
ther, recent experience belies any argument that third-party spending is 
a significant problem in the Canadian parliamentary system. In fact, the 
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(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) Liberty, Equality and Deference 301 
 
evidence points to the opposite conclusion; in Canada, money does not 
guarantee electoral success or even significant influence.  
Consider, for example, the result in the 1988 federal election. This 
election turned largely on the issue of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (“FTA”). A large number of Canadians opposed the FTA, as 
did the Liberal Party, the NDP, and numerous labour unions. The ruling 
Conservatives advanced a pro-FTA position, and were supported by a 
majority of the corporate sector, including the Business Council on 
National Issues which funnelled unprecedented sums into campaigning. 
The pro-free trade lobby spent close to 77 cents for every dollar spent 
by the Conservatives on campaign advertisements; in contrast, the anti-
free trade lobby spent only 13 cents on the dollar as compared to the 
Liberal and NDP budgets. While the Conservatives won a majority in 
the House of Commons, the Liberals and the NDP obtained a majority 
of the popular vote. Despite the unparalleled sums spent by the incum-
bents and its wealthy supporters, the anti-free trade movement prevailed 
in terms of votes cast.
24
 
The 1992 referendum over the Charlottetown Accord presents an-
other example. The referendum campaign polarized Canadians between 
the “yes” and the “no” sides. Those campaigning for the “no” side con-
sisted of a small set of groups with limited resources. By contrast, the 
“yes” side was supported by the major political parties, virtually all of 
the English media, and the business community at large. Notwithstand-
ing an overwhelming advantage in money and resources, the “no” side 
prevailed when a majority of Canadians voted against ratification of the 
Charlottetown Accord.  
A second and more fundamental reason for rejecting deference in 
the electoral realm is Parliament’s self-interest in regulating democratic 
processes. In our view, this self-interest poses a far greater threat to the 
integrity of our democratic system and public confidence in it than any 
third-party election advertising. Much of the current electoral regime is 
clearly designed to protect and promote established parties and/or in-
cumbents.  
For instance, the Elections Act provides substantial funding for suc-
cessful political parties and candidates. Candidates who receive at least 
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10 per cent of the popular vote in their riding are entitled to reimburse-
ment of 15 per cent of their campaign expenditures.
25
 Further,  political 
parties that receive at least 2 per cent of the popular vote generally or 5 
per cent of the popular vote in the electoral districts in which the party 
runs a candidate are entitled to reimbursement of 50 per cent of cam-
paign expenditures and a quarterly allowance based on a multiple of the 
number of votes cast in the district and the percentage of votes the party 
received.
26
 This funding is provided in addition to the incentives for 
donations to political parties in the form of tax credits under the Income 
Tax Act. 
Similarly, the rules relating to the allocation of broadcasting time 
during an election clearly favour incumbents. Under the Elections Act, 
at the beginning of an election period Canadian broadcasters are re-
quired to set aside 6 ½ hours of prime-time broadcasting for discounted 
purchase by parties and candidates, and a further amount of time to be 
distributed to parties and candidates for free. A Broadcasting Arbitrator 
appointed by the Chief Electoral Officer allocates the distribution of this 
free and discounted broadcasting time according to a formula guided by 
the Elections Act. The Elections Act requires the Broadcasting Arbitrator 
to give equal weight to the percentage of seats in the House of Com-
mons by each of the registered parties, and the percentage of the popular 
vote received in the previous general election. The Broadcasting Arbi-
trator must also give weight to the number of candidates endorsed by 
each party during the previous election.
27
 In other words, the more suc-
cessful the party during the previous election, the greater the allocation 
of broadcasting time available. 
Finally, as discussed above the restrictions at issue in Harper repre-
sent the effective shielding of parties and candidates from any signifi-
cant challenge by third parties. We should not underestimate the 
cumulative effect of these regulations on third-party participants and 
smaller or emerging political parties. The Canadian electoral scheme is 
clearly designed to enhance and favour incumbents and established 
political parties. Deference to Parliament’s choices is not appropriate in 
this context. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Feasby’s paper and his previous scholarship on this topic make a 
significant and valuable contribution to our understanding of judicial 
review of the democratic process.
28
 It is, however, important to put the 
regulation at issue in Harper in context and recognize that the egalitari-
an model cannot fully address the variety of participants and resources 
at play. Further, we believe that judicial deference is unwarranted and 
indeed hazardous in this context. 
Experience has shown that a high level of third-party campaign 
spending does not trigger the hypothetical evils associated with inde-
pendent expenditures, nor is its outcome determinative. On the other 
hand, there is a clear need to keep Parliament’s tendency towards self-
interested regulation in check, particularly when that tendency is actual-
ized in the form of restrictions to participation in democratic processes. 
This need is most acute in the context of electoral regulation. An elec-
tion is the point at which the voter is most in need of information from 
all sources, and thus this is the most important time for political partici-
pation by all, including third parties. Government measures that restrict 
that participation should, in our view, be strictly scrutinized. 
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